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Abstract
Floating exchange rates were supposed to automatically 
restore the external balance of an economy, leaving monetary 
policy free to pursue domestic objectives, without the external 
constraint. There was also a promise that floating exchange 
rates would not, in fact, fluctuate much and would be rather 
stable thanks to speculation. Forty years of experience with 
floating rates do not support such claims. Floating exchange 
rates have proved to be volatile, have allowed large and per-
sistent current account imbalances, have not relieved monetary 
policy form the external constraint and often, made it more dif-
ficult for monetary policy to achieve domestic policy objectives. 
What floating exchange rates made possible was the across-
the-board liberalization of cross-border capital flows which, 
growing ever higher relative to real economy transactions, 
have turned the exchange rate, out of a policy instrument, into 
a mere by-product of the interplay of speculative forces.
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1 Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates
The first major step on the road to the liberalisation of 
the financial system, ever more pronounced until the Great 
Recession, started in the mid-1970s, when the advanced coun-
tries abandoned the system of fixed, but adjustable exchange 
rates, agreed on at Bretton Woods at the end of World War II. 
Under the Bretton Woods system, countries sometimes deval-
ued or (very rarely) revalued their currency, but more often, 
monetary policy was used to correct current account imbal-
ances. More often than not, policymakers felt facing a conflict 
of objectives: a deteriorating current account forced them to 
adopt restrictive monetary policies, while at the same time, a 
sluggish domestic economy and rising unemployment would 
have required expansionary policies. Dissatisfaction with the 
system was further exacerbated by its asymmetry. Deficit coun-
tries forced to adopt restrictive policies pointed out that current 
account deficits are international imbalances – and so are cur-
rent account surpluses. There would be no deficits without sur-
pluses, but under the system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates, the burden of international adjustment falls dispropor-
tionately on deficit countries: because of constraints on financ-
ing, they are forced far earlier to adjust than surplus countries 
are, and their painful adjustment relieves surplus countries as 
well, without any pain or adjustment effort on their part.
The fixed but adjustable exchange rates were accompa-
nied by extensive controls on foreign exchange operations. 
“The broad objective of Exchange Control (was) to con-
serve… gold and foreign currency resources and to assist the 
balance of payments.” (Bank of England, 1973, p.6) While 
trade related payments were generally free from controls, or 
were, once an import licence was obtained, “covered by Open 
General Licence” (Bank of England, 1973, p.14) – at least in 
the advanced countries and from the late 1950s on -, capital 
account transactions – both inward and outward foreign direct 
investments, portfolio investments, crossborder lending and 
borrowing – were subject to controls. Trade related payments 
were regulated to ensure that they are not used to disguise 
capital transfers, and the same applied to other current account 
transactions (e. g., travel).
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The simplest and most frequently used form of capital con-
trols was the requirement to obtain licence from the foreign 
exchange authority, but there were more elaborate – and possibly 
less rigid – forms as well. Some countries (Italy, Belgium) used, 
at times, a dual foreign exchange market, with export-import 
payments taking place at the official, fixed exchange rate, while 
capital transfers were separated into another market with float-
ing exchange rate. Facing a deteriorating balance of payments 
in the 1960s, the United States imposed divers regulations on 
crossborder capital operations: the Federal Reserve required 
banks to comply with “voluntary credit restrictions” guidelines, 
the Treasury imposed an “interest equalization tax” on foreign 
bonds purchased by US residents, and the Department of Trade 
imposed regulation on American foreign direct investments 
in other advanced countries and on the repatriation of profits. 
Countries with sustained current account surpluses and facing 
massive capital inflows (West Germany, Switzerland) periodi-
cally imposed zero or negative interest rates or a 100 per cent 
reserve requirement on bank deposits by foreigners.
To avoid conflicts of policy objectives experienced under 
the system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, one school of 
economists had long been advocating the adoption of floating 
exchange rates (Friedman, 1953). According to their argument, 
exchange rates, floating freely in response to changing demand 
for, and supply of, a currency would automatically rebalance the 
balance of payments, as the exchange rate of the currency of a 
deficit country (its supply exceeding demand) would depreciate, 
boosting exports and slowing imports; and vice versa for a sur-
plus country. “The fundamental argument for flexible exchange 
rates is that they would allow countries autonomy with respect 
to their use of monetary, fiscal and other policy instruments, 
consistent with the maintanaince of whatever degree of freedom 
in international transactions they chose to allow their citizens, 
by automatically ensuring the preservation of external equilib-
rium.” (Johnson, 1969, p.12) Importantly, there was a promise 
that floating exchange rates would not, in fact, fluctuate much 
and would be quite stable thanks to speculators. “A freely flex-
ible exchange rate would tend to remain constant so long as 
underlying economic conditions… remained constant, random 
deviations from the equilibrium level would be limited by the 
activities of private speculators, who would step in to buy for-
eign exchange when its price fell (the currency depreciated in 
terms of foreign currencies)”. (Johnson, 1969, p.17)
Balance of payments adjustment through monetary pol-
icy would have implied extremely painful conflicts of objec-
tives following the oil crisis of 1973. The sharp increase in the 
world market price of oil (and other energy carriers) required 
a profound change in relative prices, i. e., a large increase in 
the price of energy (and of energy intensive products and ser-
vices) relative to all other prices. Inflation had been accelerating 
is most advanced countries (the Phillips curve had been shift-
ing up-wards and to the right), and the profound realignment of 
relative  prices would have led to a further acceleration of infla-
tion well into the two-digit territory (if it had taken place via 
an increase in energy prices even faster than general inflation), 
or would have resulted in a jump in the unemployment rate (if 
it had taken place through a strong deceleration of the rate of 
increase in non-energy prices). Whether policy-makers chose 
accelerated inflation or rising unemployment, it was difficult for 
them to stay the course for long. Trying to slow an inacceptable 
rise in inflation quickly led to a no less inacceptable increase in 
unemployment. Policies switching back and forth under such 
constraints made it impossible to stick to a fixed exchange rate.
Speculators proved unable to stabilize floating exchange 
rates in the period following their general adoption from 1973 
onwards, under monetary policies shifting frequently and 
unpredictably between inflation and unemployment objectives. 
However, from the early 1980s on, central banks in advanced 
countries adopted monetary policies consistently aimed at 
price stability. Such monetary policies should have resulted 
in more stable exchange rates, moving only in response to 
“underlying economic conditions”, with “random deviations” 
“limited by the activities of private speculators”. This is not 
what has happened.
2 The Liberalization of the Capital Account
The liberalization of the capital account started in the mid-
1970s, soon after the general adoption of floating exchange 
rates, under the double argument that capital controls can be 
circumvented and, in any case, they are no longer needed as 
floating exchange rates take care of external equilibrium. 
The movement started in the United States, continued first 
in the United Kingdom, took place progressively in continental 
Western Europe in the 1980s, and spread to most formerly cen-
trally planned economies in the 1990s, and much of the devel-
oping world. This has lead to ever-increasing international 
capital flows. According to triennial surveys by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) daily turnover of world foreign 
exchange markets grew as follows (in billions of US dollars):
Table 1 (Source: BIS, 2013a)
Year Billions of US dollars
1998 1527
2001 1239
2004 1934
2007 3224
2010 3971
2013 5345
Relative to such amounts, official foreign exchange reserves 
are negligible: at end-2012, total foreign exchange reserves of 
all countries amounted to somewhat less than 11 trillion USD 
(BIS, 2013b, p.22). Projecting those daily turnover data onto 
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annual basis, it is clear that foreign exchange market turnover 
far exceeds, at least 50-fold, the value of world trade (according 
to Unctadstat, world exports amounted to some 18 trillion USD 
in 2012). In other words, real economy transactions give rise 
only to a tiny fraction of foreign exchange market activity. The 
vast majority of foreign exchange market transactions relate 
to capital flows. Market demand for, and supply of, individual 
currencies only marginally depend on the amount of exports 
and imports to be settled; they depend far more importantly on 
the motives of movers of capital – investors, speculators, bank-
ers, fund managers, etc. There is no reason to think that those 
motives generate currency demand and supply resulting in 
exchange rates that equilibrate trade or current account imbal-
ances. Even if (or when) crossborder capital movements are 
dominated by currency traders followers of fundamental analy-
sis, indicators of the fundamentals of economies are far from 
providing unambiguous guidance: they are numerous, often 
point in contradictory directions, “market attention” shifts from 
one set of indicators to another, the time horizon over which 
one or another of the indicators is supposed to be determinant is 
unknown and variable, etc. It is hardly more than pure coinci-
dence if exchange rate movements resulting from such analysis 
point in the direction of correcting  current account imbalances 
– except over the very long term. And this even without men-
tioning the influence of currency traders following other strate-
gies: chartists, followers of news or interpretations of news, 
rumors, herd behavior, etc.
All this, of course, does not mean that current account 
imbalances do not get corrected under floating exchange rates, 
but the least one can say is that, based on an analysis of the 
data of 170 countries covering the period of 1971-2005, there 
is “an utter absence of any robust association between the de 
facto nominal exchange rate regime and the speed of current 
account adjustment” (Chinn and Wei, 2009, p.17). It has been 
shown that external disequilibria grew much larger after the 
abandonment of fixed but adjustable exchange rates and the 
liberalization of the capital account: in the period 1972-2009 
and as a percentage of GDP, current account imbalances were, 
on average, more than twice those in the period 1944-1971. 
These much bigger imbalances were possible because interna-
tional capital flows grew fast from the mid-1980s, and espe-
cially from 1995 onwards, reaching 17% of world GDP in 2007 
(Haldane, 2010 and Speller et al., 2011).
3 Capital flows and the real economy:
the case of the huge country with a
highly developed financial system
With floating exchange rates and liberalized crossborder 
capital movements, the logical chain leading from real econ-
omy transactions (current account imbalances resulting from 
export and import flows) via financial flows (changes in for-
eign exchange reserves or foreign borrowing) to exchange rate 
changes may easily reverse: financial (capital) flows move the 
exchange rate up or down, which, in turn, results in current 
account deficit or surplus or, in other words, to changes in the 
domestic production/absorption relationship. One example is 
developments in the balance of payments of the United States 
and the evolution of the exchange rate of the dollar in the 
second half of the 1990s. The dollar kept appreciating along 
with a growing deficit in the current account of the U.S. This 
was made possible by a massive capital inflow, pushing the 
exchange rate of the dollar ever higher, which resulted in a 
deteriorating trade and current account balance. A deteriorating 
current account reflects a decline in (the rate of growth of) pro-
duction or/and an increase in domestic absorption and it is dif-
ficult to tell which of these two possible consequences (or what 
combination) prevailed. An appreciating exchange rate hin-
ders exports and stimulates imports, but, at the same time, the 
capital inflow may contribute to the expansion of productive 
capacities, balancing or even exceeding the negative impact on 
domestic output of the deteriorating trade balance (Higgings 
and Klitgaard, 1998). In the given period and context, there 
is some reason to think that the overall impact (of the capital 
inflow and exchange rate appreciation) on domestic output may 
have been negative. Much of this period saw the development 
of the dotcom bubble and there is no doubt that part of the capi-
tal inflow went to further inflate the bubble with little, if any, 
positive impact on domestic output. (Dollar appreciation barely 
outlasted the collapse of the bubble.)
A short while after the collapse the of the dotcom bubble, a 
real estate boom started, the immediate antecedent of the finan-
cial crisis. There are different views on the causes of the real 
estate bubble. One school holds the view that the main cause 
was a too loose monetary policy, keeping the federal funds 
rate between 2002 and 2006 at a much lower level than would 
have been justified (Taylor, 2009). The other school stresses, 
beside other factors, the role of the massive purchase by for-
eigners of US securities of high credit quality: “… an impor-
tant part (55%) of the high-rated securities issued by American 
residents between 2003 and 2007 was sold to non-residents” 
(Bernanke, 2011, p.22), partly to emerging economies with 
excess savings, and partly to the rest of advanced countries, 
principally Europeans (here defined as the Eurozone plus the 
UK). “As it turned out after the outbreak of the financial cri-
sis, many European financial institutions financed their pur-
chases of American assets through short-term dollar liabilities, 
like Treasury bills and bank deposits, the majority of which 
attracted American investors” (Bernanke, 2011, p.25) “Given 
the vigour of the demand for safe American assets, it would 
have been surprising if there had not been a corresponding 
increase in the supply of such assets… the wish to respond 
to the demand for safe assets by international investors was a 
decisive factor in the process of transforming risky loans into 
well-rated securities” (Bernanke, 2011, p.26) And “… this may 
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help explain why the yield on American assets perceived as 
safe increased little despite the tightening of monetary policy 
and the large amount of mortgages issued.” (Bernanke, 2011, 
p.26) In other words, international capital movements, includ-
ing domestic savings intermediated by foreign financial institu-
tions, were powerful enough to blunt the impact of a substantial 
tightening of the monetary policy of the most powerful of cen-
tral banks (the federal funds rate increased from 1% to 5,25% 
between 2004 and 2006), feeding the bubble to inflate till col-
lapse. (For a similar analysis see also Hyun Song Shin, 2011). 
One would be tempted to conclude that this experience shows 
that even with floating exchange rates “independent monetary 
policies are possible if and only if the capital account is man-
aged” (Rey, 2013, p.1)
4 Emerging markets and international capital flows
For many years now, there has been a familiar analysis 
of what went wrong in financial crisis – stricken emerging 
economies. Fiscal and monetary policies had been loose; the 
exchange rate had been overvalued; an undeveloped and under 
regulated banking system had gone on a lending binge, on-
lending short-term funds borrowed abroad to domestic compa-
nies and households, often in foreign currencies. After several 
years, something ignited the crisis: very often, it was investors 
realizing that the course was unsustainable and withdrew fast 
and massively from the country’s banks and securities markets. 
To avoid financial crises, it is recommended to pursue disci-
plined fiscal and monetary policies, let the exchange rate float 
freely, promote the institutional development of the banking 
system, adopt adequate financial regulation, etc. Recently, it 
has been recommended to develop a domestic savings base 
large enough to replace foreign funds when they are suddenly 
withdrawn (IMF, 2013). 
Needless to say that economic policies and financial regu-
lations can go badly wrong for a multitude of reasons unre-
lated to international capital flows. Still, the very least one 
can say is that the present international monetary and finan-
cial system does not facilitate the task of pursuing balanced 
and sustainable policies. Emerging markets are particularly 
exposed to massive crossborder capital flows resulting from 
factors outside their control. Recent research emphasizes the 
role of global factors in international capital flows. Forbes 
and Warnock analyse episodes of large capital inflows and 
outflows in 50 emerging and developed economies over the 
period 1980-2009 and find that “… waves of capital flows are 
primarily associated with global factors. Global risk, which 
incorporates both risk aversion and economic uncertainty, is 
the only variable that consistently predicts each type of capi-
tal inflow episode… domestic factors are generally insignifi-
cant in explaining capital flow waves”.  (Forbes and Warnock, 
2012, p.236). What is more, “There is a global financial cycle 
in capital flows, asset prices and in credit growth… (which) 
co-moves with… a measure of uncertainty and risk aversion 
of the markets… The global financial cycle is not aligned with 
countries’ specific macroeconomic conditions… (and) one of 
the determinants of the global financial cycle is monetary pol-
icy in the centre country” (Rey, 2013, p.1).
Faced with massive inflows when global risk is perceived to 
be low (and especially when advanced country monetary poli-
cies are expansive), emerging market governments have sev-
eral policy options – all with serious drawbacks. One answer to 
surging capital inflows can be letting the exchange rate appre-
ciate, but currency appreciation does not insulate the domestic 
economy from undesirable consequences: unless the policy 
starts from a seriously undervalued exchange rate, currency 
appreciation will hurt competitiveness, the current account and 
the domestic economy and makes the currency increasingly 
vulnerable to sudden reversals of capital flows. The result is 
hardly better if the central bank cuts domestic interest rates (in 
order to make its currency less attractive to capital inflows) or 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent currency 
appreciation and leaves the excess liquidity in the economy 
as the resulting inflation, real exchange rate appreciation and 
deteriorating current account will, over time, invite a rever-
sal of capital flows. And if (when) there is reversal, it is usu-
ally brutal. Analysing the impact on emerging markets of the 
expected tightening of American monetary policy (“tapering 
talk in the summer of 2013”), Eichengreen and Gupta conclude 
that “… emerging markets that allowed the largest appreciation 
of their real exchange rates and the largest increase in their cur-
rent account deficit in the prior period… saw the sharpest cur-
rency depreciation, reserve losses and stock market declines”. 
It is hardly a consolation that “… measures of policy funda-
mentals and economic performance (the budget deficit, the 
public debt, the level of reserves, the rate of GDP growth) do 
not indicate that better fundamentals provided better insula-
tion” (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2013, p.15).
Protecting the economy from an undesirable amount of capi-
tal inflow would, theoretically, only be possible through one 
of two ways. One is sterilized intervention. Intervention in the 
foreign exchange market could prevent exchange rate apprecia-
tion and sterilization could prevent excess liquidity created by 
intervention from leading to higher inflation, real exchange rate 
appreciation and current account deterioration. Massive inflows 
would require massive intervention and sterilization which, 
even if possible at all in the relatively modest domestic capital 
markets, would be very costly. Indeed, massive inflows require 
large low-yielding foreign exchange reserves, as such inflows 
are mostly portfolio and other financial flows rather than for-
eign direct investment: “… the Greenspan – Guidotti rule rec-
ommends that countries hold foreign exchange reserves equal 
to 100 percent of their short-term external debt” (Gagnon, 2012, 
p.5). This recommendation may easily prove over-optimistic. 
In early 2014, the World Bank warned that “in a ‘disorderly 
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adjustment scenario’ financial inflows could decline 80 per cent 
for several months” (Financial Times, January 16, 2014, p.24) 
and then emerging economies with foreign exchange reserve 
“only” about twice short-term debt plus current account defi-
cit (“Gross External Financing Requirement”) would be at risk 
(Financial Times, January 16, 2014, p.1)
Lastly, the emerging economy facing strong inflows can 
resort to capital controls. For countries considering the grow-
ing participation in the international division of labour as one 
of the most important drivers of economic development, intro-
ducing capital controls is not an easy decision, as “the greater 
the integration of an emerging market country into global mar-
kets, through current account transactions, long-term capital 
flows, and direct investment, the less efficient will become 
the control mechanism on short-term capital inflows or out-
flows” (Lamfalussy, 2000. p.132). Capital controls may distort 
financial and economic decisions, can be circumvented and, 
because they can be circumvented, they tend to escalate (loop-
holes found and exploited by economic agents will have to be 
closed by additional controls, and so on). Nevertheless, when 
macroeconomic instruments are no longer available to protect 
from inflow surges (the exchange rate is not undervalued, no 
room for further monetary easing or fiscal retrenchment, etc.), 
when prudential measures in the regulated financial sector are 
not enough (because much of the inflow takes place via the 
unregulated, financial and non-financial, sectors) capital con-
trols are inevitable (Ostry et al., 2012, p.3)
If capital controls are inevitable in those circumstances in 
order to protect the domestic economy from massive destabi-
lizing capital inflows or to preserve domestic policy independ-
ence (Rey, 2013), and if they are costly and burdensome, who 
should bear that burden? The recipient country (ies) alone, or 
should the burden be partially internalized by source countries 
(Ostry et al., 2012)?
5 Burden sharing in international adjustment
The idea of burden sharing in international adjustment is 
anything but new (Williamson, 2011). From Keynes’ proposal 
at (or before) the Bretton Woods conference on the post-war 
international monetary system through various official and 
academic proposals, attention was given to excessive current 
account imbalances. This was quite understandable at Bretton 
Woods and during the decades following World War II, as 
capital controls were widespread and it could be reasonably 
assumed that international imbalances originating in capital 
flows can and will be dealt with through capital controls, with-
out much affecting the real economy. In such a world, cur-
rent account imbalances can result from developments in the 
real economy (differences between countries in productivity 
growth, propensity to save, etc.), or from differences in poli-
cies. In both cases, policies should adjust. As deficits cannot 
emerge without surpluses and vice versa, without adjustment, 
deficit countries impose surpluses onto surplus countries or, 
surplus countries impose deficits onto deficit countries
In today’s world of free international capital movements, 
current account deficits can be imposed on a country via capi-
tal flows, unless the country accumulates potentially excessive 
foreign exchange reserves or imposes necessarily costly, dis-
torting and permeable capital controls. Countries get called cur-
rency manipulators when they use official financial flows (for-
eign exchange market interventions) to achieve an exchange 
rate for their currency that results in a (growing, excessive) 
current account surplus, imposing current account deficits on 
other countries (Gagnon, 2012; Bergsten and Gagnon, 2012). 
Private capital flows can and do achieve the same result. If an 
efficient international monetary system requires some degree 
of burden sharing, as it does, in current account adjustment, 
then it also requires burden sharing between source and recipi-
ent countries in managing international capital flows.
Source country contribution to orderly international capi-
tal flows could, theoretically, be done through their monetary 
policy taking into account not just domestic policy objectives, 
but also international consequences. But generally requiring 
policy makers to give priority consideration to the interna-
tional consequences of their activities over domestic policy 
objectives would be unreasonable and unrealistic. That leaves 
us with the need for outflow controls in source countries. It 
is sometimes said that outflow controls are even less efficient 
(leakier) then inflow controls. This may be true in the case 
of controls aimed at preventing capital flight (widespread 
speculation on large currency depreciation or devaluations, 
heightened political risk, etc.), but it is not clear  why outflow 
controls should be less efficient than inflow controls when out-
flows are motivated by interest rate differentials, speculation 
on the appreciation of a currency, etc.
6 Capital flows and exchange rates
Given an international monetary and financial system where 
source and recipient countries share the burden of maintain-
ing orderly international capital flows, would exchange rates be 
more stable and move more in line with economic fundamen-
tals? One can hope so. If some of the potential capital outflows 
are retained by source country controls, there is less pressure 
on recipient countries to suffer excessive currency apprecia-
tions or current account deficit (possibly with higher domestic 
inflation), or both, because capital inflow controls are the cost-
lier and the less effective the higher the pressure.
What would be the interest of source countries in impos-
ing capital controls? First, massive capital outflows from a 
country may be generated by real or perceived attractions in 
other countries (interest rate differentials, expected currency 
appreciations, perceptions of undervalued stock markets, etc.), 
and the outflows may, at times at least, be contrary to what 
would be needed by the domestic economy. If, e. g., a country 
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pursues quantitative easing with the aim of bringing down 
long-term domestic interest rates to boost economic activity, 
the leakage of monetary stimulus via capital outflow weak-
ens the policy (Ostry et al., 2012, p.20). Unless, that is, the 
(unavowed) aim of quantitative easing is depreciation of the 
home currency, that is, a currency war. This leads to a second 
argument in favour of capital outflow control. It is inconsistent 
to ask current account surplus countries to share the burden 
of international adjustment (by, e. g., abstaining from foreign 
exchange market intervention) while refusing the same princi-
ple for capital account adjustment.
How much control is needed and how to distribute controls 
between source and recipient countries? There is no general 
answer to these questions since the strength of attraction (real or 
perceived) to move capital out of a country and into another one 
is variable over time and across countries. Still, there is a need 
for indicators that help to resolve disputes over which country 
is responsible for, and should be expected to take action against, 
undesirable capital in – and outflows. It has been suggested 
to consider a country currency manipulator if it accumulates 
reserves beyond specified limits (Bergsten and Gagnon, 2012). 
Such proposal is, at the very least, ambiguous when not distin-
guishing between reserve accumulation resulting from foreign 
exchange market interventions aimed at maintaining an under-
valued exchange rate and a current account surplus, and those 
helping to insulate the domestic economy from the undesirable 
consequences of capital inflows. In addition to, or rather instead 
of, reserve accumulation as an indicator, there might be several 
other approaches; using exchange rate movements may be bet-
ter than others. Fast appreciating or depreciating exchange rates 
are much more likely to indicate strong capital in - or outflows 
than worsening current account imbalances. Countries in such 
cases should be expected to take action on both sides, sharing 
the burden of preventing destabilizing capital flows. This would 
amount to (require) some kind of exchange rate commitment 
(to a given exchange rate, to a fluctuation band, to a path, etc.). 
Just as free capital flows must be accompanied by freely float-
ing currencies, preventing destabilizing capital flows requires 
management of the capital account and that seems to require 
management of the exchange rate.
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